Port of Portland

CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONIES
08/00/2003	Defining Port Security
08/08/2003	The Port of Portland Experience
07/22/2003	Facing the Real Problem of Harbor Pollution
07/18/2003	Capt. Jeffrey W. Monroe, MM
6/30/2003	The Continental Border
3/20/2003	Cargo Containers: The Next Terrorist Threat
3/18/2003	United States Maritime Service Reserve
5/7/2003	In the Wake of the Morro Castle
10/11/2201	On Security of Transportation

FACTS
• Portland is the second largest crude oil port on the U.S. East Coast.

• Portland is the third largest oil terminal port on the U.S. East Coast.

• Portland is the largest throughput port based on tonnage in New England

• Portland is the second largest international passenger port in New England.

• Portland's cruise ship calls will increase from 16 in 1999 to 49 in 2000.

Source: State of Maine

Departments of Environmental Protection and Transportation, City of Portland

Department of Transportation and Waterfront, Massachusetts Port Authority, Portland Fish Pier Authority.
Statistics based on 1998 Totals and FY 99 Totals for City facilities.

Good Morning. My name is Captain Jeffrey Monroe, Director of Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland, Maine. Thank you for your invitation to speak on the progress of the Safe Port Act. Today, I will be commenting on three areas of port security that can be summarized as global, national and local.

Everyday some 75,000 Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit (TEU) containers move in and out of ports in the United States alone. This poses a significant threat to ports and communities throughout the nation. Since 9/11, with the increasing focus on maritime security, we have reduced the threats to the United States through several programs including the Customs-Trade partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security initiative (CSI), The Smart Box program, and the Advanced Trade Data Initiative. The programs are designed to supply much needed information about supply chain partners and shipments and to protect a complicated supply chain.

While these programs are of critical value, their implementation is advancing much too slowly. Although the industry recognizes the value of securing the nation’s supply chain, the requirement to secure cargo with C-TPAT specified seals is meeting resistance from shippers. The concern is that the costs of implementing an electronic seal program are high and standards for these devices have yet to be completed. The industry does not want to invest in expensive experimental technology until a proven and cost effective federal standard has been set for container security devices.

Another key concept that ties in with new technology is the Greenlane concept, which is being touted as an incentive to shippers to add these new devices. However, this program is also off to a slow start as Greenlanes in seaports do not exist at this point and there is no real movement for their establishment.

While Customs tracking has improved, inspections increased, shippers recruited for pre-clearance programs and reporting of manifests have been made more efficient, new initiatives designed to improve cargo security continue to move at a very slow pace. However, it is apparent that although cargo security is one of the nation’s most significant threat issues, multi-agency coordination and effective policy development remains a minor function of the Department of Homeland Security.

The current Office of Cargo Policy at DHS needs to be elevated in the DHS structure and must be more active in its outreach to industry. Further, this office must have a far reaching view of cargo security as part of a transportation system that includes maritime, aviation and surface. Recovery from attack or natural disaster requires a systematic approach. It will make little difference if a port is able to open without the landside infrastructure ready to deliver and accept cargo. For too many years, our national transportation system has suffered from a modal approach as opposed to a systematic approach. It would be a major mistake for us to mirror this ineffective model in Homeland Security.

Cargo and the policies that impact the movement of goods related to security must have significant attention within DHS. We cannot continue to think myopically, focused on some small segment of security without looking at the entire picture. For example, this lack of a coordinated approach is currently providing us with a TWIC system that does not meet the original goals of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential. Instead of the one system as originally envisioned, it appears that there will be separate standards for maritime and aviation. The aviation system was able to credential and clear hundreds of thousands of workers in a relatively short period of time. Yet, some six years after 9-11, we are still in the process of implementing the TWIC standard for the maritime world, which is different from the system already in use. Additionally, to date, nothing has been done to address TWIC in regard to surface transportation.

As a professional merchant mariner, seaport director, airport director and member of the DHS National Maritime Security Committee, I had to go through four separate background checks, each with differing standards. This amazes me that one single and effective approach cannot be designed and implemented in a shorter period of time. That same issue will exist with cargo security, which will also cause significant delays. Although we are currently focused on containers, there is a wide range of cargo movements that seldom get addressed. Project cargo, bulk and neo-bulk cargoes, and other specialized activities all have their own element of security risk. A high level policy office could address not just one type of cargo, but all logistical movements.

Such an office could also reach out to a broad segment of the industry. I believe we have reached a point where a government/business summit should be held and reasonable target dates for specifications and implementation of cargo security programs must be established and implemented.

The formation of a high level policy office for cargo security was proposed in legislation by Senator Collins last year. It was a good idea then and it is an even more essential idea now. I would encourage this committee to address this in the near future.

We cannot afford to continue to work with obscure standards and poorly coordinated programs. We feel the lack of progress in our ports. For example, The Port of Portland includes activities in both of the cities of Portland and South Portland. In 2006, the Port was the 26th largest port in the United States in gross tonnage. We are the largest oil port on the east coast, the largest tonnage port in New England and the largest foreign inbound transit port in the United States (Source-US Army Corps of Engineers). Though geographically small in size the port continues to be a microcosm of all port activities, with growing container and break bulk businesses, international ferry and domestic ferries serving and commercial and recreational boating interests. Our transportation system alone, in a City of 65,000 and a region of 350,000, handled some 6.5 million passengers in our system and nearly 30 million tons of cargo.

The Port is the home of a mix of public and private stakeholders committed to ensuring that the letter and the spirit of the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) are always an integral part of any port planning initiative. To that end, our success to date in becoming a model of interoperability would not have been possible without the cooperation of professionals and public officials and the funding we have received through the port security grants program.

Through seven rounds of funding of approximately $6MM, we have been able to meet the requirements of the MTSA. These funds have allowed us to purchase the fences, lighting and screening technology required to date and we are ready for the next steps in TWIC development. But we have gone further.

Portland has developed an all-hazard approach to planning. We have examined each of our security requirement solutions for attributes beyond prevention. All Homeland Security funding now flows through one center to ensure that systems are interoperable and to avoid redundancy. We coordinate our programs with our neighboring cities and meet often with public and private stakeholders. Besides our close working relationship with the United States Coast Guard, we also maintain ongoing coordination with the TSA, US Customs and Border Protection, and federal, State and local law enforcement. We have done this out of necessity, utilizing available funds to the maximum advantage.

However, we view transportation security as a partnership between maritime, aviation and surface transportation agencies and providers and share resources and information across the wide spectrum of activities. We also recognize our important place in the community and understand that we are not only protecting the traveling public but our citizens as well.

Lessons learned from a number of natural disasters have also taught us that this all-hazard approach is necessary not only for deterrence of terrorist attacks but for the recovery of commerce and continuity of government programs and services. Only the close monitoring of all-hazard programs will identify fault lines in our approach. Only communication with our neighbors will allow us the resiliency required to protect our citizens. We do not understand why this same model cannot work in Washinton.

As we continue to hear that resources should be directed to only “bigger ports”, we realize that to allocate funding to ports based on simple quantitative analysis does not sufficiently consider the enormous impact a disruption in port commerce would have on the entire region. It does not consider our status as an international border crossing and it does not reflect recent history. The reasons that two of the 9/11 hijackers chose to begin their assault on the US from Portland have never been fully explained.

We recognize that Portland is of a size that makes participation among all parties somewhat easier than a more highly urbanized area. But the commitment to an all-hazard approach and the integration of all stakeholders is possible through the leadership of the communities and a desire to put the good of the entire system ahead of individual interests.

The equipment and training that we have been able to acquire through the Seaport Security Grant Program allows us this practice for disaster and to insure we share the best intelligence available. We know that we are far better prepared than we were in 2001 or even 2005. We know that we are still learning the best ways to achieve a totally integrated security and response package. And we know that it will take more funding, more commitment of our time and continuing leadership. We are prepared to continue our work.

Above all however, the Department of Homeland Security must get its arms around the critical issue of port and supply security. The leadership must begin in Washington and work its way throughout DHS, to the State level and ultimately to the communities dealing with these issues. We simply must do a better job in looking at the entire picture and while the various key pieces of legislation related to port and cargo security have moved us ahead; our national bureaucracy remains an impediment to effective implementation of that legislation.

In speaking to you from the trenches, I hope that the intentions of this Committee, Congress and our Administration are to dramatically increase the effectiveness of cargo and Homeland security. To that end, I hope that we will put as strong an emphasis on cargo security as we have on other elements of Homeland Security and that we will remove the bureaucratic boundaries that inhibit making our entire system as secure as humanly possible.

Spring is here and Portland’s cruise ship season is starting early. On April 14th the MINERVA II OF Swan Hellenic Line will call on the port with 500 passengers aboard. The early start is mirroring a trend in the industry to visit ports in New England and Atlantic Canada earlier this year. A number of vessels have booked ports throughout the summer including Holland America Line which will be calling on Portland regularly beginning at the end of May. Portland has 33 ships booked so far for 2004.

“We are fortunate that this year is looking much better than last,” said Capt. Jeff Monroe, Director of Ports and Transportation for the City. “Last year we had only 21 ships but this year we are seeing a more prestigious group of vessels including the QUEEN MARY 2 calling with more passengers per ship.” The port could host nearly 45,000 passengers this year on cruise ship calls.

There will be a presentation to the Captain of the ship commemorating the vessel’s maiden call at 1100. The press is invited to attend.

October 30, 2003 - The city of Portland welcomes the last cruise ship of the season today, as Royal Caribbean International's Grandeur of the Seas makes the final call for the 2003 season.

"This year was a good, solid season," said Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, Port Director, "it wasn't our best and it wasn't our worst, but it was one that saw us host many of the premier ships in the world."

The Grandeur of the Seas is the last of 35 vessel calls in the port this year. That total includes 23 cruise ship visits and 12 additional calls by military and specialty ships, such as the Amistad. In total, 33,000 people visited Portland, bringing nearly $233,000 in revenue to the city.

"Cruise ships, and visits by other vessels, are a tremendous source of revenue for the City" added Monroe. "The passengers are on vacation and looking to bring home mementos from their trip. They fill our shops and eat in our restaurants. The ship's restock with food, water and supplies. All of this is a boon to the Portland economy."

Even before the year closed, the city's Port Department began looking ahead to 2004 and beyond. The efforts are focused on attracting the attention of the larger and financially sound cruise lines, continuing to build Portland as a leading destination. The port already has booked 29 calls for 2004, including the maiden visit of the Queen Mary 2, and 10 for 2005.

"The entire cruise business is undergoing a dramatic transformation," added Monroe, "We have to do more just to keep up. The cruise lines have told us they are disappointed with our facilities and that Portland has a lack of image in tourism circles. We hope that by expanding our marketing and the opening the Ocean Gateway facility in 2006, we'll lure them back."

While the mega ship season comes to a close today, visitors will still be coming to Portland into November as the Scotia Prince has extended it season.

"The Scotia Prince is a perfect example of how well a long-term relationship with a ship operator can benefit the city," said Monroe. "We're striving for that type of a relationship with the cruise lines."

The annual Tug Muster will take place on Sunday 17 August in the Port of Portland as part of the annual MS REGATTA HARBORFEST. The Muster schedule is as follows:

9:30 AM Tugs depart Portland Ocean Terminal for Maine State Pier. Press may park at POT and ride tugs to Maine State Pier. 15 Minute ride.

10:00 Tugboat Crew Competition, Exhibitions and Entertainment on the Maine State Pier. Press may park next to the "Whale Wall" on the wood pier area.

1:00 Tugboat Muster Parade-All tugs depart Maine State Pier for parade in the harbor. Press may park next to the "Whale Wall" on the wood pier area. Press may board and ride tugs in parade and during pushing contest and races. Total time aboard 2 hours-several tugs will host.

This years event will include two categories of tugs in the Classic Boat Division (under 2,000 horse power) and Powerhouse Division. Portland Tugboat LLC, McAllister Towing, Winslow Marine, Cianbro and numerous other companies will have vessels in competition. There will be several historic tugs including the Fanny J, one of the oldest tugs in the United States still in service and the Justine McAllister, who participated in the evacuation of people from Manhattan Island on September 11, 2001.

PORTLAND TUGBOAT, LLC
Subsidiary of McAllister Towing Corp.
40 Commercial Street, Portland, Maine 04101

The JUSTINE McALLISTER is a classic harbor tug built during the post World War II era. Constructed in 1949, the tug spent most of its active years serving in the Port of New York and New Jersey for McAllister Towing. The tug was used primarily for docking ships and later barge work in the port.

On September 11, 2001, the tug, along with numerous other tugs and commercial vessels, assisted in the evacuation of Manhattan Island after the attacks on the World Trade Center. Along with several other McAllister tugs, she ferried hundreds of people out of the City of New York who were not able to leave by other means.

The tug was assigned to the Port of Portland in 2002 and is used for vessel docking and barge work. The JUSTINE McALLISTER is 100 feet long and is rated at 1,800 horsepower, giving her a service speed of 10 knots.

The tug, one of the last of her kind in service, is slated for retirement in 2004.

Portland Tugboat LLC has announced that a new state of the art tractor tug will be joining Portland's important tugboat fleet. The 5,000 HORSE POWER tractor tug VICKI McALLISTER, has arrived in port and will be used to dock the largest ships calling on terminals in the port of Portland.

"Having this tug join our fleet is part of an ongoing commitment by McAllister Towing and Transportation to insure that Portland has the finest and newest equipment available," said Capt. Brian Fornier, President of Portland Tugboat LLC, a fully owned subsidiary of McAllister Towing of New York. "This tug is one of the most powerful in use in ports today and will give us an expanded capability to handle the biggest ships in the port".

The VICKI McALLISTER was built in 2001 at Eastern Shipbuilding of Panama City Florida. The vessel has a full 360 degree wheelhouse and twin Z-Drive stern propulsion units. The crew of three can use the tug to dock tankers or any other large vessel calling on the port. The vessel was formally used in Puerto Rico for docking Navy ships in San Juan.

In addition to advanced navigation and propulsion, the vessel also increases the ports firefighting capability. The tug has two three thousand gallon per minute fire monitors with foam capability aboard.

"We are very excited about this addition to the McAllister and Portland Tugboat fleet", said Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, the City's Director of Ports and Transportation. "These types of tugs are only deployed in significant locations and the industry has come to recognize Portland as a major port in this nation".

THE PRESS IS INVITED TO TOUR THE VESSEL ON MONDAY JUNE 23RD AT 1200 AT THE PORTLAND OCEAN TERMINAL, 40 COMMERCIAL STREET, PORTLAND AND RIDE THE TUG DURING A DEMONSTRATION OF ITS UNIQUE HANDLING ABILITIES. THE TRIP WILL LAST 30 MINUTES.

The Port of Portland will host the training ship of the Texas Maritime Academy, the T/V Texas Clipper II, which will arrive at the Portland Ocean Terminal at 0800 on Friday June 13. The training ship of Texas A&M University at Galveston is on a two-month voyage along the U.S. coast as part of the groups annual summer cruise. The 394-foot training vessel acts as a "floating classroom" where students attend academic lectures and receive maritime instruction. Cadet training aboard the Clipper includes practical experience in operating and maintaining the ship as well as courses in seamanship, navigation, and safety.

The ship departed Galveston May 26 with port stops in Boston; Portland, Maine; Charleston, S.C.; New York City; Key West, FL.; and Houston. Approximately 120 cadets train aboard the ship in the process of earning their licenses to sail as U.S. Merchant Marine officers. These students also can earn a marine or maritime degree from Texas A&M.

The Texas Clipper II is one of only five state maritime academy ships currently in use in the United States, including Maine. The vessel will depart Monday, June 16.

NOTE: Due to security concerns, port officials in Portland are requiring media who wish to cover the arrival of the Texas Clipper II or interview cadets aboard the training ship to notify Texas A&M or Portland officials in advance. Contact Teri Fowle, Texas A&M Universities Media Relations Director at (281)455-1971 or Captain Jeffrey W. Monroe, Director, Port of Portland at (207)541-6915.

May 27, 2003 - Portland opens its 2003 cruise ship season today when the Rotterdam, the 1300-passenger flagship of the Holland America Line, docks at the Portland Ocean Terminal at 0700.

"We are excited that once again a top cruise line operator has chosen Portland as a destination," said Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, Port Director. "Having a ship the caliber of the Rotterdam kick off our year is a fantastic way to begin."

The Rotterdam is the first of 22 vessel calls by mega-ships this year. These ships represent the future of the industry because they offer passengers a wider range of onboard activities and amenities.

"Having Holland America as a partner is an encouraging sign of things to come," added Monroe. "It's one that marks the strengthening of a productive and longstanding relationship."

In response to changing industry trends, the city's Port Department has focused its marketing efforts on attracting the attention of the larger and financially sound cruise lines.

"We've had some success," added Monroe, "but the entire cruise business is undergoing a dramatic transformation. We have to do more just to keep up."

For those who are willing, the cruise business can be very lucrative. In 2002, the port hosted 43,000 passengers on 43 cruise ship calls, and the city collected almost $300,000 in fees. This year, 34 calls were booked initially, but Regal Cruise Lines suspended service eliminating 12 visits. Other, more aggressive cities are reaping the rewards of a growing interest in the New England-Canadian market. For example, Boston will host 91 ships this year, Bar Harbor 71 and Halifax over 100.

"The cruise lines have told us they are disappointed with our facilities and that Portland has a lack of image in tourism circles," said Monroe. "We hope that by expanding our marketing and the opening the Ocean Gateway facility in 2006, we'll lure them back."

The City has already booked 22 mega-ship calls for 2004, including 12 calls by Holland America Line ships beginning in June. Additionally, the port will host the maiden call of the Queen Mary 2.

The City of Portland will welcome the historic schooner Bagheera to the waterfront in an official ceremony at 12:00 noon on the Maine State Pier. The vessel is the first vessel of its kind to be given a regular berth at Compass Park, site of OPSAIL and numerous other historic ship visits. The schooner will provide regular harbor sailings for the public. A number of seaports have special public facilities for historic vessels.

"We believe that having this historic schooner at Compass Park will enhance the offerings to the general public," said Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, Port Director. "This certainly keeps with the public's demand for unique maritime activities on our waterfront".

The Bagheera was launched in 1924 by the Rice Brothers Shipyard in East Boothbay, Maine. The schooner was designed and built by John G. Alden. The vessel was used by several owners as a private yacht until 1930.

During World War II she served in Chicago as a training vessel as part of a six-week training program for officers who needed to learn how to handle a ship at sea and for docking. In the 1950s she was shipped across the Atlantic, and then she sailed back from the Mediterranean Sea. She returned to the Great Lakes where she remained through the early '70s, when two brothers sailed her down the US East Coast to the Caribbean, through the Panama Canal, and then on to the Galapagos Islands. In the mid-1980s, after being wrecked and abandoned, she was rebuilt and brought to Los Angeles and was refitted for the passenger trade. The current owners found the boat in Richmond, California in April 2002, shipped her to Maryland by truck and then sailed her up to Maine, arriving in Portland last year. This will be the first year the vessel will sail regular cruises from a public facility. Bagheera is built of wood, mahogany and yellow pine planks on oak frames. She is a two-masted, staysail schooner, with auxiliary power provided by a Westerbeke diesel.

The official welcoming ceremony with port officials will include a traditional ship's blessing and presentation to the captain and crew by the City. The vessel will take guests and press on a short sail after the welcoming ceremony.

Portland, ME, April 28, 2003 - VIP Tour & Charter Bus Company and Mermaid Transportation announced new services today. VIP will begin its weekend "Freeport Explorer" service on Saturday, May 3, and Mermaid will operate daily service from Auburn and Topsham to the Portland International Jetport.

"Private companies are beginning to fill a niche in public transportation," said Jeff Monroe, director of the Portland Department of Transportation. "Multi-modal travel, from train to bus or from van to plane, is made easier and more efficient through the leadership of entrepreneurial companies like VIP and Mermaid."

VIP's "Freeport Explorer" offers weekend service from the Portland Transportation Center on Congress Street to Freeport from May 3 through December 31. The service connects easily with Amtrak's Downeaster weekend operations, giving train passengers the opportunity to take a bus to Freeport.

"Freeport is an attractive destination for people visiting Maine," said Ray Penfold, owner of VIP. "With no public transportation currently available, we saw a unique chance to fulfill a need."
The "Freeport Explorer" departs the Portland Transportation Center at 12:30 p.m. and 3:00 p.m., returning from Freeport at 1:15 p.m. and 5:40 p.m. Fares are $10 one-way or $20 roundtrip, while children 10 and under ride free.

Additionally, Mermaid Transportation Company, which has for several years given travelers in the Portland area an efficient way to get to the region's airports, now brings daily van service linking the Auburn and Topsham areas with the Jetport.

"We are well-known in the Greater Portland," said Steve Klein, owner of Mermaid Transportation. "With this new service, we offer more travelers a relaxing and stress-free way to begin their trip."

Mermaid's service leaves frequently between 5:30 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. from the Park & Ride lot at the Auburn exit (exit 12) of the Maine Turnpike, and from the Park & Ride lot at the Topsham exit (exit 20, near the Topsham Fair Mall) of I-95. Return trips from the Jetport to Auburn and Topsham run from 9:30 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. Round trip fare is $25.00.

Portland's Director of Ports and Transportation, Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, will testify before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding "Cargo Containers-The Next Terrorist Target." He is scheduled to appear on Thursday, March 20, 2003 at 9:30 AM in Room SD-342 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building.

Capt. Monroe's testimony will focus on container cargo and what measures are being taken, as well as what needs to be done, to secure cargo shipments. A copy of the testimony will be available from the Department of Ports and Transportation after 12:00 PM today. Contact us for a copy of the document at 541-6915.

Portland is Maine's largest seaport and primary container port. Last year the port handled 2,331 loaded containers last year using two lines, Hapag-Lloyd and Sealand-Maersk at the International Marine Terminal. The port handles cargo for shippers in every county of the State of Maine.

The City of Portland has applied for over three million dollars in security grants under the Federal Maritime Security Act of 2002. If the money is received, it will be used for expanding the port's waterfront camera system, and providing scanning equipment for personnel and containers. The money will also be used to build a new maritime border crossing for the international ferry service that uses Portland.

"This money will be critical to Maine's largest port as we continue to improve security at our marine facilities", said Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, Director of Ports and Transportation. "I am very pleased that the federal government is placing a higher priority on seaport security."

The City is working with federal agencies to improve scanning and detection using advanced screening equipment. The equipment, if the grant received, will be used for passenger screening for the international ferry and cruise ships similar to what is done at the airport. In addition, new methods and equipment for container screening will be developed.

"We are confident that what we have achieved so far has certainly greatly improved our waterfront security", Monroe continued, "But we still have more to do." The City received a grant from the federal Maritime Administration for $175,000 last June. The money was used for technology improvements and a new camera system. The US Coast Guard is currently looking over the request. The City should hear from the federal Maritime Administration in June regarding the grant.

CUNARD LINE has announced that their newest ship, the RMS QUEEN MARY 2, still under construction, will call on Portland in 2004 during its maiden voyage. At 1,132 feet long, 135 feet wide and 150,000 gross registered tons, QM2 will be the largest, longest and widest passenger vessel ever built. She will be just 117 feet shorter than the Empire State Building is tall, yet she will carry just 2,620 guests, served by nearly 1,300 crew.

"We are very excited about this vessel coming to Portland. It shows that one of the most prestigious companies in the world remains committed to this port", said Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, Director of Ports and Transportation for the City. "The clientele on this vessel will be very upscale and the economic impact form this type of vessel is enormous".

The vessel is still under construction but Cunard has begun planning the ship's itineraries for her maiden voyage in 2004. The vessel is slated to replace the older QUEEN ELIZABETH 2 which will be retired from service. The ship will not be able to dock at the Portland Ocean Terminal due to her size and will go to anchor. Passengers will be ferried into the Maine State Pier on small tenders. The proposed Oceangate Facility when completed will have a berth capable of handling the ship alongside.

"We will a royal welcome for the new Queen when she arrives" continued Monroe, "A maiden voyage is a special event in a vessel's life and we want to make sure this ship, her passengers and crew will feel right at home". A number of events will be planned around the ship's visits including receptions and exhibits. The vessel will call on Portland as follows:

Date: January 13, 2003
To: News Directors
From: Sandra Needham, Marketing Manager Phone: (207) 541-6918
Re: Annual State of the Port Report

The City has released its annual State of the Port Report and New England's largest seaport remains healthy. "Even though the economy is shaky right now, the Port of Portland is in excellent shape," said Ports and Transportation Director Jeff Monroe. "Our working waterfront continues to be a successful economic engine for the State". The 2002 report focused on the Port's international and domestic passenger trade, cargo, the fishing industry and marine industrial activities. International passenger trade remained steady; there were increases in domestic passengers and cargo, a decrease in fish landings and a significant increase in waterfront employment due to the oilrig project.

Monroe pointed out that a number of major projects have been completed in the last 4 years, and plans for a new international passenger facility, expanded Casco Bay Lines terminal and new container terminal are in the works. Portland is one of the few seaports in the country that covers all of its operating and capital costs. Monroe concluded, "We are growing in an economy that is not, we are competitive, and improving every year mostly due to a diverse economic mix on our waterfront". Portland is New England's largest tonnage seaport and second largest fishing port; the second largest oil port on the U.S. East Coast and the largest foreign inbound transit tonnage port in the United States.

Capt. Jeffrey W. Monroe, MM
Director of Ports and Transportation
City of Portland, Maine
August 2003

In the modern world, perhaps the biggest challenge related to port security is trying to figure out what everyone is responsible for and exactly how that impacts our individual realm of management. Since September 11, 2001 there has been no shortage of zeal with regard to preventing, and responding to, every conceivable threat that may impact our marine transportation system. Those efforts have redefined the traditional roles of Federal, State and local agencies in the United States.

The fact that port security is now in the forefront of thinking for government authorities is an amazing accomplishment in itself. There was a very concentrated effort on improving security in the aviation industry in the first year after 9-11. Fortunately, through the efforts of many of us in the industry, there is now a great deal of support for improving maritime and port security as well.

Defining port security is a complex undertaking, perhaps best accomplished by looking at the various agencies that interact to take on the challenge of, pardon the pun, a fluid task.

In the simplest of terms port security can be viewed in two ways, depending on the type of operation. In practical terms, from the shoreline out and from the shoreline in. It must also be looked at in the terms of types of cargo-containers, oil, gas, bulk, neo-bulk, chemicals, or in consideration of the passenger.

The complexities of port security begin with the various agencies entities each with a pivotal role. Lets look how that works in the United States.

International requirements are defined under the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Ship and Port Facility Safety Code (ISPS Code) and managed by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Requirements are applicable to national member states to the extent those nations choose to approve or accept the requirements. Each member nation provides representatives to the IMO for the purposes of establishing policies related to international maritime safety and security. The USCG represents the United States at those meetings. Formal agreements in the United States are subject to Senate approval. U.S. regulations are designed to be consistent with IMO requirements.

Department of Homeland Security- This Cabinet level department is the primary organization responsible for the nation's homeland security efforts. The agencies that make up the Department of Homeland Security in whole or in part are housed in one of four major directorates including: Border and Transportation Security, Emergency Preparedness and Response, Science and Technology, and Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection.

The Border and Transportation Security directorate brings the major border security and transportation operations under one organization including; Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Federal Protective Service, Transportation Security Administration, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and Office of Emergency Preparedness.

The Emergency Preparedness and Response directorate oversees domestic disaster preparedness training and coordinates government disaster response including the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Strategic National Stockpile and the National Disaster Medical System, Nuclear Incident Response Team, Domestic Emergency Support Teams, and the National Domestic Preparedness Office.

The Science and Technology directorate is designed to utilize all scientific and technological advantages when securing the homeland. Those assets consist of CBRN Countermeasures Programs, Environmental Measurements Laboratory, National BW Defense Analysis Center, and the Plum Island Animal Disease Center.

The Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection directorate analyzes intelligence and information from other agencies (including the CIA, FBI, DIA and NSA) involving threats to homeland security and evaluates vulnerabilities in the nation's infrastructure. It uses agencies including Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, Federal Computer Incident Response Center, National Communications System, National Infrastructure Protection Center and the Energy Security and Assurance Program.

The Secret Service and the United States Coast Guard are also located in the Department of Homeland Security and report directly to the Secretary.

United States Coast Guard-USCG responsibilities can be broken down into two areas. The first is safety and shore side security, which is managed by the Marine Safety Office under the Coast Guard's "M" program. These personnel work with terminal operators, port authorities and vessel operators to look after the regulatory requirements associated with port safety and security plans, vessel safety and security compliance and operational inspections.

The second is harbor security managed by Coast Guard operational groups under the "O" program. These personnel look after harbor safety and security and are equipped with vessels and aircraft capable of handling harbor patrols, escorts and search and rescue.
Often, responsibilities for these areas fall under separate command structures within the same port. Each command is assigned an operational area, which can include several ports and numerous miles of coastal waters and inlets.

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection-This is a new agency formed by the merging the former US Customs Service and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service. In the maritime area, this multifaceted agency handles cargo control including entry, clearances and customs duties. They also handle passenger entry and screening of personal belongings. BCBP has two operational groups including the inspection and enforcement divisions.

Transportation Security Administration-The TSA was created after 9-11 to manage aviation screening with eventual extension to all modes of transportation. Although they primarily look after airline passengers and baggage at this time, several pilot programs are underway to have them screen cruise ship and ferry passengers. The TSA was also created to provide a level of coordination among federal agencies that deal with all modes of transportation.

Department of Justice-Under the Attorney General (President's Cabinet), the DOJ is the primary law enforcement agency in the United States. Sub-agencies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Division of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). While their duties extend far beyond port security, there is critical interaction between port law enforcement agencies and the DOJ. The DOJ is also one of the key sources for threat intelligence. Each State has local attorney general representatives.

Department of Transportation-This federal department's role has shifted since the US Coast Guard was moved from DOT to the Department of Homeland Security. The DOT continues to look after nationwide transportation issues related to policy, funding and promotion including the Marine Transportation System (MTS) and the nation's seaports. The DOT manages maritime issues through the Federal Maritime Administration (MARAD).

Other Agencies-Although not primarily involved in port security, several federal agencies are involved in port activities and are engaged as appropriate. These include the Department of Agriculture (DOA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) and Center for Disease Control (CDC).

Emergency Management Agency-Under the authority of the governor of each of the fifty states, this agency is primarily responsible for emergency response. These agencies work through county and municipal entities as established. They have been working with port authorities to assess threats and define response protocols.

Attorney General-Each state has its own attorney general under the authority of the Governor. In regards to port security, they look after applicable law enforcement.

Office of Public Safety-Depending on the state, a governor may have a cabinet level position that deals with public safety including law enforcement. This office may oversee the State police and other public safety entities.

Environmental Protection-Each state also has a Department of Environmental Protection that provides regulatory oversight and response support to environmental threats. Reporting to the governor, these agencies often have law enforcement divisions which include Marine Patrols for States with ports, harbors and bays.

Department of Transportation-All states have departments under the authority of the governor that deal with the vast array of transportation issues in each state. They are often the conduit through which federal funding is made available for transportation projects. They also establish policy, coordinate promotion and may operate seaports, airports and other transportation facilities.

Enabled Port Authorities-Quasi-public agencies may be established between multi-governmental jurisdictions including states or cities. These entities and their scope of responsibilities are defined under State legislation.

Harbor Commissions- Harbor Commissions and their management boards are generally created by State legislation and are multi-jurisdictional. Their duties in the United States generally include law enforcement, permitting for non-federal harbor projects, moorings, recreational vessels, safety and security.

Other-Other state agencies that may be involved in security include Health Departments, Turnpike or Highway Authorities and other legislated agencies.

Emergency Management-For states with county governments (parishes in Louisiana), emergency management agencies may exist coordinated by the state's emergency management agency. Their tasks are similar to the state agency, coordinating activities among the municipal agencies with their jurisdiction.

Law Enforcement- Counties often have their own sheriff's departments who have law enforcement responsibilities within their jurisdiction.

Incorporated Municipalities-Cities, towns or boroughs have a wide variety of governments and management entities. In many communities, there is an elected mayor who is the senior public official. The policy making body is usually a group of elected members forming a council or board of selectmen. The council or board may engage a city or town manager where a full time mayor is not employed. These entities, depending on size, can have a wide range of managers that often mirror federal and state functions. The fire chief is generally the senior emergency response manager and the police chief the senior law enforcement officer. Municipalities that operate airports or seaports often have airport managers or harbor masters, or transportation directors.

Other-Many communities through local agreements participate in mutual aid associations, supporting each other with additional resources as necessary for law enforcement, emergency response and communications.

Ultimately, there is no shortage of agencies that are either heavily involved or involved when necessary in regards to port security. The challenge is often not the number of agencies but the scope of their regulatory jurisdiction in regard to security issues. Sometimes the rules that each agency operates under may conflict with each other, and industry or civil authorities find themselves ultimately having to resolve issues between various agencies.

There is also a critical pecking order with regard to authority but federal agencies have ultimate authority overall. State agencies are subject to federal authority and, in turn, possess authority over county or municipal entities. The US Coast Guard is often seen as the lead agency in seaports due to the scope of their jurisdiction but only to the extent that another federal agency does not have control of a particular area of responsibility. To resolve potential conflicts, the USCG has developed the Incident Command Structure (ICS) for response to oil spills or other emergencies that threaten the Marine Transportation System. This structure involves federal, state, municipal, port authority and industry personnel working together to respond quickly to events. This system is well rehearsed for oil spills or similar incidents, but is essentially reactive in the form of a structured response to an emergency. The program however establishes a template for a proactive program that must now be developed at the multi-jurisdictional level.

The responsibility for port and vessel safety has long resided in the realm of a single agency, the US Coast Guard. It soon became apparent that response to an incident would need to involve many agencies and ports through their Port Safety Committees (PSC) developed Marine Incident Response Programs (MIRP) or Teams (MIRT). The critical lesson learned in safety was that prevention was more effective than response and while there remains a strong emphasis on responder capabilities including equipment and training, new regulations and increased monitoring have greatly increased harbor safety.

With regard to port security, prevention, to the extent it is possible, is the most effective tool in management. However, with multiple federal agencies now involved and a host of other agencies not used to working within an Incident Command Structure, the challenge of prevention may become the paramount issue to resolve. In emergency response to marine incidents, the challenge was easier as the Coast Guard worked with State or local agencies in the Incident Command Structure. Often Fire Departments, with critical input from industry professionals, took the lead on responses with Coast Guard support. The Coast Guard retained the jurisdiction to "federalize" a response if that activity was not effective or inter-agency disputes arose. Now with several federal agencies with overlapping responsibilities and equal levels of authority involved, the dependency on clear areas of authority and working relationships becomes more significant.

The creation of a single federal cabinet department provides the best opportunity for insuring that federal agencies coordinate their management of security issues. The weaknesses in the federal system were evident after 9-11 and many of those issues are in the process of being resolved. In addition, the Transportation Security Administration was formed to create a coordinated approach to transportation security among the many agencies in the Department of Homeland Security. Weaknesses however still remain.

Intelligence is considered the most effective tool in preventing incidents or responding to threats. Federal agencies are often limited in what they can provide in the form of quantified information due to internal restrictions or a desire to protect sources. Often information takes days to arrive at the local level through different federal routes. The same information is often classified differently by federal agencies, which makes it available through one group while its classified Security Sensitive Information (SSI) by another. The end result is that the local level agencies that can best use the data for prevention often do not see it in a timely manner. One way to insure that such information is timely is to insure that local civil jurisdictions have personnel that have been given appropriate security clearances for essential information.

The federal government often collects data from law enforcement agencies all over the nation. When asked recently why this information was not shared with local authorities, Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the information was fragmented and hard to classify. Federal authorities need to recognize that information provided by law enforcement personnel or private citizens can be placed into a data stream and analyzed by professionals in the field. Every bit of data does not need to be quantified. Local officials can review data and determine if some element is applicable to their area of responsibility. Stolen equipment, photographing of facilities, criminal activities, trespass incidents and other similar incidents can provide insights into developing precautionary measures based on what officials nationwide are experiencing. Such data can be reviewed and considered by local officials in their planning and operational efforts. This would prevent overreacting to every piece of information. Such information is vastly different than defined threat data which should require specific response protocols.

Beyond information sharing, officials must develop working relationships with each other. That includes meeting on a regular basis through a coordinated system. Since
9-11 practically every agency has held regular meetings regarding security requiring enormous amounts of time being invested by personnel. A structured and managed approach to lateral and vertical information sharing and planning can be developed to make proactive management more effective. Those relationships can then be solidified and tested in practical applications such as tabletop or full-scale exercises.

Finally, government agencies must work with industry representatives to determine how plans can be maximized for effectiveness. Under the Federal Maritime Security Act of 2002, the Administration is directed to create a Maritime Security Advisory Committee comprised of industry professionals. This committee should be called up as soon as possible and should provide a forum for industry to help federal officials meet the new challenges of Homeland Security. The industry should not use this opportunity as a forum to prevent implementation of new regulations because they may have a financial impact or be inconvenient. Working cooperatively, agencies and industry can determine together if regulations are impractical and should not be implemented.

Ultimately, the federal government must recognize that that the only effective way to manage the new challenge of homeland security is to lead a team that involves everyone on the front lines. The sharing of information, the development of working relationships, and practical practice and training will be the only successful strategy for facing the challenges of a significant change in managing commerce while meeting the potential threat to our way of life. Then all we have left to do is figure out how to pay for it.

Captain Jeffrey W. Monroe, Master Mariner, is the Director of Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland. The Department operates the Portland International Jetport, Portland Ocean Terminal, Maine State Pier, Portland Fish Pier and International Marine Terminal. The marine terminals serve the cruise and international ferry industry, domestic ferries, fishing industry, container trade and marine industrial activities providing employment for nearly 1,500 people. The Department also coordinates surface transportation programs in the City. Portland is the largest City in the State of Maine and the Port of Portland is the largest foreign inbound tonnage transit port in the United States, the second largest oil port on the U.S. East Coast, and the second largest international passenger and fishing port in New England.

Presented by Captain Jeffrey W. Monroe, MM
Director-Ports and Transportation
City of Portland, Maine

There are those moments in history when you can remember exactly where you were and what your were doing when some tragic event happened. For me, on the morning of September 11th, I was with my entire senior staff at the airport when the word first came that an aircraft had hit the World Trade Center in New York. My first thoughts were if it might be one of our early flights that departed Portland for LaGuardia. If this was a tragic incident that involved Mainers, I was sure that the local media would want details and we would have to be ready to support the airlines as they dealt with families. Word came soon after that it was a larger aircraft and not one of the regional jets that serviced New York out of Portland. Soon afterwards, another message. A second plane had hit the other tower. The meeting ended and we all found ourselves staring at the television, reliving the actual moments as they took place. Then a call from the FAA-the feds were closing the nation's airspace and a second phone call, local media were on their way to the airport. We were to expect diverted aircraft and this was being regarded as a terrorist act.

When events like this take place, you kick into auto-pilot. Training, instinct and hopefully good sense takes over and you react quickly. My waterfront staff was dispatched to the port and they began the process of shutting down the terminals. The first ship was due in that night and a meeting with the Coast Guard was set up. Airport personnel likewise enacted security protocols, aircraft were unloaded and pushed back, the terminal was cleared of passengers and information bulletins about cancelled flights were being prepared. The media arrived in full force and we set up a press conference. We had very little information to give anyone but we knew that there would be a great deal of concern on the part of our citizens. We needed to get on the air, we needed to look calm and tell people things were under control, flights were cancelled, "don't come to the airport" was the message, the marine terminals were also closed, bus service was running as were the ferries-children would not be stranded on the mainland. The reporters were great, getting feeds back to their stations and passing along every bit of information we could make available, which was not very much.

Staff was busy trying to find hotel rooms for stranded passengers. Transportation companies were being coordinated to move passengers along to their destinations. We lost all track of time. Reports from waterfront staff confirmed that all facilities were secure. Staff had not heard officially from the Coast Guard as yet. Rumors were circulating that the port was closed or that we were under Marshall Law. I asked my operations manager to set up a meeting with the Marine Safety Office so we could get lay out a plan. Just after noon, we sat down with the Coast Guard to discuss the vessels scheduled to arrive. The international ferry from Yarmouth, NS would be first. She carried over 600 passengers and 100 cars that trip. After much discussion, it was decided that she should be permitted to dock and unload. She would not however be permitted to leave with passengers. It appeared that the borders would be closed. First challenge-let 800 passengers planning to board that evening know that they were not going on the ship. Next, see if there was someplace for those who needed it, to stay. Customs and Immigration would be ramping up to a level beyond their normal protocols. That night 600 souls came ashore-no one spoke, no one commented, only quiet answers to official questions. Everyone seemed stunned.

We also had a cruise ship due in early next morning from Canada. They had left port and were already enroute. The Coast Guard felt it best not to permit them to enter. There were over 800 passengers aboard and most were from New York. They would be desperate for information; some had family members who worked at the World Trade Center. The Coast Guard agreed to have the vessel first detained at the harbor entrance for inspection, and then would allow it to dock.

The next morning, after a two-hour delay for the planned Coast Guard inspection, the vessel arrived at the berth. 800 passengers and 400 crew were ordered off the vessel for clearance procedures. They waited in a building with the legal capacity of 500. The ship sat along the pier-fully operating without a soul aboard. Officials were following protocols established for there are of responsibility. No one was receiving guidance from Washington. Locally, we were trying to deal with logistics, expressed safety concerns and tried to act as mediators between government agencies, agents, ship's crew, State and local officials, passengers' longshoremen and a host of other personnel.

After the ship departed, we had a chance to sit down with everyone and tried to address the numerous issues that had come up. I wasn't even thinking about the airport at that time as there was no activity in the aviation system, except for the burning question, when would it reopen. Then I got a call from a reporter at the Boston Globe asking if I was aware that the government suspected that two of the hijackers had come through Portland.

For the next several days, we dealt with getting the airport open, trying to get guidance from federal agencies on the waterfront, working on solving local issues between agencies and us and trying to answer the increasing press demands for information regarding the hijackers. In the midst of all of this, we gave updates to our elected officials and our Mayor who did an exceptional job along with the City Manager in making sure we had the resources of the City at our disposal. Our Congressional Delegation including Senators Snowe and Collins, and Representatives Allen and Baldacci, met with us to hear about our concerns and listen to our suggestions for dealing with the issues that had come up. I was invited to appear before Congress and the Committee chaired by Senator Snowe who eventually filed legislation that would evolve into the formation of the Transportation Security Administration. Congress had set deadlines for aviation but maritime security was taking a back seat. Once again our delegation came forward and through their leadership, port and maritime security began to rise to a higher level of priority. New legislation was filed including the Maritime Security Act of 2002 and grant money was made available. We watched very carefully as the Department of Homeland Security took shape, expressing concern about the increasingly shifting role of the Coast Guard to port security to the possible detriment of their traditional regulatory and search and rescue functions. We made an effort to support increased resources and new equipment for them through various appropriations bills in Congress.

Last winter, I was once again invited to testify before a Congressional Committee. This time Government Affairs, Chaired by our Senator Susan Collins. I highlighted concerns about container security, reaffirmed our support for initiatives being advanced by the U.S. Customs Service, testified about the need for additional port security grants and new personnel and emphasized that we still have much to do.

Two years later, I can honestly say we have made excellent progress. We have received nearly $1.5 million (U.S.) in federal grants to buy new equipment for security purposes. New gates have been installed to prevent access and perimeter fencing has been improved. We are in the process of installing a state of the art surveillance system at all of our terminals. New detection equipment is being ordered to screen our cruise ship and international ferry passengers. We have requested permission from the TSA to begin a pilot program that would have TSA personnel design and operate a screening facility on the waterfront exactly like we have at our airport including the same equipment and personnel. We are designing a new international passenger terminal with program elements reflecting new and proposed security requirements. Our terminals are in full compliance with current regulations and protocols are in place for each MARSEC level. All terminal personnel and users have been issued identification badges using the template in place for our airport badges pending final approval of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.

Terminal tenants and carriers meet on a regular basis to exchange information, address problems and correct security issues. All department personnel have new equipment designed to enhance communications and response including update databases for direct contacts. Police and security personnel share information, not only on the waterfront, but at our airport as well. We have developed a system whereby data transmitted from the TSA, Coast Guard or Homeland Security is immediately distributed to aviation, maritime and surface transportation personnel. We have also developed a reporting system where suspicious activity is relayed to the FBI.

Perhaps most significantly, we are involved in helping our elected officials and the general public understand how security must be addressed and how it will impact the lives of our citizens. We communicate regularly with our Congressional delegation, particularly our Senators, who continue to support us in addressing transportation security. We do regular media reports and keep our citizens informed about what is happening in the world of transportation. We also encourage feedback to regulatory agencies regarding new ideas or issues that come up with the public.

Our current focus is the concept of the Continental Perimeter. This is not a new concept. Our two nations worked together during World War 2 to protect North America from Axis spies and sabotage. They shared information, personnel, used similar procedures, provided each other equipment, shared command and control, jointly guarded our coastlines and in fact, were successful in controlling the infiltration of spies and saboteurs. What is different today? Our nations face a common enemy-those radical forces who would seek to change our way of life. Commerce between our two nations is important to both our economies. My port alone is responsible for over 29 million tons of oil moving to your refineries in Ontario and Quebec. That cargo alone has given our port the distinction of being the largest foreign inbound transit port in the United States and possible the largest oil port on the U.S. East Coast. Before then it was grain, now its containers, paper products and other commodities. The flow of cargo, goods and tourists by all modes of transportation cannot be interrupted or made inconvenient. If that occurs, than these radicals have achieved their goals.

As Canada prepares to ramp up, you will face the same issues we have addressed over the last 23 months. Our Congress set goals for our federal agencies. Many have been achieved. Aviation security in both our nations is better. Cargo and passenger tracking has improved. Intelligence is being shared. But we have spent enormous amounts of money achieving those goals. In some cases, we have had to set limits and rethink some of our programs as we did with the TSA. We need to think smarter and we need to work together.

Our nations share a 5,500 mile border. Both of our nations are utilizing resources and personnel to protect ourselves from each other. It is a monumental task. So I am suggesting that we take a new perspective. Lets figure out how we can dedicate those resources to where they will do the most good-at our seaports and airports that accommodate inbound traffic from off continent areas. Lets return the border crossings to the days before 9-11 and focus on working together on common procedures, shared intelligence, effective utilization of personnel and though our respective governments-mutual effort toward achieving our common goals.

Trucks, trains and tourists should be able to be checked quickly at mutual border crossings with the new technology we have available. Our databases are better, we pick things up faster. Cargo should not have to be delayed at the border. If it comes in and is inspected by a Canadian or U.S. Customs official, using the same techniques, databases, equipment and procedures, than it should be able to move to its destination in the other nation with only a quick entry and duty check at our border. Passengers coming from Canada on cruise ships, ferries or aircraft should not have to go through extensive background checks to enter Canada or reenter the United States if that cruise originated in the States.

By dedicating our resources to our seaports and intercontinental airports, we will be able to make more resources available and spend less money on protecting our mutual border. The area we need to guard will be compressed to the seaports, airports and coastlines that border the oceans that protected us during World War 2. Our effectiveness will increase because of these tight control points and more resources will be available form our respective governments to accomplish our task.

New regulations are coming. Seaports cannot afford unfunded mandates. We are also in this for the long haul. Those who seek to do us harm are very patient and we will continue to face the issues we face now far into the future. We need to think ahead, look at the big picture and plan more efficient methods before we begin spending enormous amounts of money based on the narrow view by each agency in regard to what they feel they need individually to accomplish their specific mission.

The Continental Perimeter is not a political issue-it is an issue of practically. It is not an issue of culture-but an issue of cooperation. As we in this industry have worked hard to figure out how to sensibly address this new threat, we need to encourage our respective governments to work together to insure that what must be accomplished by all of us is carefully thought out, cooperatively managed and practically applied.

I will continue to work with my Congressional delegation, in particular Senator's Snowe and Collins, who have been leaders in our nation in security issues. I would encourage you to do the same with your elected offices. We are in a position to address this by working with those we trust with managing our nations. Transportation has never been safer. We still have a way to go but as the aviation industry has learned to work together, so can the ports, other modes of transportation and eventually our two governments at every level. That should be our mutual goal and I look forward to working with all of you in the future.

Statement of CAPTAIN JEFFREY W. MONROE, M.M., Director
On Security of Transportation Systems

Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. As the Director of Ports and Transportation for the City of Portland, Maine, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss my Department's experiences following the events of September 11th.

My department manages the Portland International Jetport, the City's surface transportation programs and the municipal marine facilities in the Port of Portland. With a population base of 65,000, we handle nearly 5 million people annually through our transportation facilities and on our public transportation systems. I would like to briefly explain the security situation of the port as compared to the airport, including other modes of transportation like buses and trains. I want to emphasize that transportation on land, sea and air as a whole, must be dealt with in a coordinated manner across the country

The Jetport is the largest airport in Maine, serving some 1.4 million passengers annually. We have several inter-city and intra-city bus service providers handling nearly 2 million passengers annually and we anticipate the start of new AMTRAK passenger rail service to Boston before the end of this year.

Also critical to our transportation network is the Port of Portland. Which, while small in physical size, is home to a vibrant and diverse economy. Our harbor includes petroleum, container and break bulk terminals, as well as cruise ship facilities, international and domestic ferry terminals and commercial fishing facilities. We have a strategic energy connection to Quebec through a major petroleum pipeline. Portland is the largest tonnage throughput and international passenger port in New England, the second largest oil port on the U.S. East Coast and the number two fishing port in New England.

But like our aviation systems, our ports by their very nature, have inherent weaknesses making them vulnerable to attack. I know that this committee is familiar with the final report of Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports (The Seaport 2 Commission Report, Fall 2000) and An Assessment of the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS, September 1999). We concur with the recommendations contained in both reports. The events of September 11th demonstrated many of the problems in the infrastructure and operations of our transportation system outlined in the reports.

Our ports lack the same level of coordinated federal preplanning common in the world of aviation. Unlike airports, where local authorities undertake pre-approved federal action plans in time of emergency, seaports manage everything locally. There are no standardized procedures among ports and there is no cohesive database regarding petroleum, cargo and passenger movements. Every vessel is handled differently. Each federal agency works within its own set of protocols.

During the period after the September 11th incidents, we were faced with a number of passenger vessel calls in the port. How local representatives of federal agencies managed each vessel seemed to vary daily. Each had different requirements, which were being interpreted by personnel at the local level without coordinated federal direction. The U.S. Coast Guard was stretched to the limit, patrolling the harbor while trying to maintain their search and rescue responsibilities. Other federal agencies took actions they thought were appropriate within their own realm of responsibility. In more than one instance, all passengers and crew were ordered off a foreign flag ship by U.S. Immigration into our terminal, creating a potential safety issue ashore. In another case, every member of the crew of an American ship, all U.S. citizens, were ordered to pack their belongings by U.S. Customs and to remove them from the vessel for inspection. During these instances, the City's resources were stretched to the limit in trying to protect their safety. Tanker operations and vessel movements were appropriately placed under significant restrictions. However, federal agencies had to quickly gather information on fuel availability and demand which should have existed in a readily accessible format. The U.S. Coast Guard did what they could in trying to balance the need for security against supply.

Each federal agency followed their own rules and regulations for dealing with emergency situations. There seemed however, to be little or no guidance from federal managers in Washington DC and little coordination among federal agencies. Vessel operators reported different actions being taken by the same agencies in different ports. Cruise ships, with tens of thousands of passengers, scrambled without any federal coordination to find any pier where passengers could be handled when the Port of New York was secured. There was no unified high level federal command structure, no common communications among federal, state, municipal and private entities regarding ports and threat assessments were not promulgated in a coordinated manner. Only the professionalism of local governmental officials working together with private entities, prevented a bad situation from getting worse.

In most cases, the full extent of the threat was never formally communicated. We secured our seaport and airport in the hopes it would be sufficient. Our resources were stretched to the limit. As you are aware, a state's or municipality's civil authority is limited to three strategic areas of security: prevention, crisis management and consequence management. A city or state does not have the assets available to be fully prepared for threats from enemies who may attack employing methods including conventional weapons or nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological agents. Ports are critical assets, not only to cities and states, but also to entire regions.

The Seaport Commission recognized that "improved coordination - among and through public and private marine transportation system stakeholders at the local, regional and national levels is a key element." The depth of knowledge required for preparation for each of the threats listed above can only be achieved through Federal interagency, city, state and private cooperation. We fully endorse such a coordinated approach and encourage the Federal Interagency Committee for Marine Transportation System (ICMTS) to include security issues as a top priority.

Certainly, as the FAA is to aviation, so must the role of the U.S. Coast Guard be expanded in port management in order that it can plan and take action in a similar 4 fashion to its sister agency under the Department of Transportation. That expanded role must include appropriate financial support. The City of Portland has long advocated full funding for the United States Coast Guard to meet its already demanding mission. We also support funding for new security missions with which the Coast Guard may be tasked. We note Senator Hollings" Bill S.1214 provides for such funding, but we believe that the bill's funding levels will need to be increased to match an expanded U.S. Coast Guard mission.

All modes of transportation need to be considered under a central management team in the event of national emergency. Seaport, rail and bus facilities need to adopt the similar planning methods and protocols that are used in aviation. The experiences since September 11 clearly demonstrate that federal coordination is imperative. Although the situation surrounding the Greyhound bus incident of October 3rd proved to be an isolated one, it demonstrated the need for broad based planning. Every mode of transportation, and their associated facilities and infrastructure, is a potential target.

On September 11th, our airport shut down, flights were grounded and passengers were stranded. Trains - many containing chemical cars - continued to roll through metropolitan Portland. Tanker movements were restricted, petroleum reserves were disappearing and every passenger ship that entered port was faced with rapidly changing rules. Trucks and buses moved cargo and passengers as they do every day, with no restriction. Clearly, someone should have been thinking of the transportation system as a whole.

The FAA, U.S. Coast Guard, Federal Rail Administration, Federal Highway Administration, Motor Carrier Safety Administration, along with U.S. Customs and Immigration, need to have their roles expanded to meet this new threat. They must also all be coordinated under a central federal framework. The coordination should come in the form of a new Federal Emergency Transportation Agency, who will maintain and provide current data, do a wide range of preplanning, coordinate emergency response and manage post response logistics. That agency would work with FEMA, U.S. 5 Customs and Immigration and the Department of Justice to insure high level federal coordination. Such a concept is included in the legislation proposed by Senator Snowe in S.1462.

Finally, the role of our federally supported airport deployment of our National Guard needs to be expanded to seaports and other large volume transportation facilities. Loans and grants to municipalities and states to support increased security demands need to be made available and allotted in an expeditious manner. The economic impacts of the September attack are just becoming clear but costs to the City of Portland for new security measures are crippling the City's budget. Losses to businesses in Maine are measured in the millions of dollars. The City of Portland cannot bear the increased costs by itself. The State of Maine cannot bear these costs. We need expanded federal help in the immediate future.

In closing, the State of Maine possesses more miles of coastline than any state in the continental United States. We share a border with Canada and we are a hub of international trade. Our City has an excellent working relationship with the FAA, U.S. Coast Guard and other federal agencies. The Port of Portland is a microcosm of port activities across the nation and the City of Portland is a microcosm of transportation.

On behalf of the City of Portland, its officials, and citizens, we stand ready to work in developing a port and transportation program improving interagency coordination and communication nationwide. We appreciate the hard work and support provided by our federal partners in meeting the threat of September 11 and we look to a stronger relationship in the future. The lessons we learned in assessing our readiness must be translated into a plan of action that can be achieved quickly as we work to protect our citizens.

Capt. Jeffrey Monroe, MM
Director, Ports and Transportation
City of Portland, Maine

Note: In September 1934, the SS MORRO CASTLE, a passenger ship belonging to the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company (Ward Line) was returning to New York after a voyage to Havana, Cuba. Only 4 years old, the ship was on its 174th voyage when in the early morning hours of September 8th, while in a storm off the coast of New Jersey, the ship caught fire. The fire spread quickly and eventually, after loosing all steering, the acting captain, William F. Warms, anchored the vessel off Spring Lake New Jersey. Only a few hours before the fire began, the regular master was found dead in his stateroom. The ship was taken in tow but eventually broke free and drifted onto the beach at Asbury Park, New Jersey. Considered one of the most significant maritime disasters of the 20th century, 134 passengers and crew lost their lives. The following presentation was made on May 3rd, 2003 as part of the opening of a new exhibition on the disaster at the Maritime Industry Museum, on the campus of the State University of New York Maritime College, Bronx, New York.

It has been nearly 70 years since the flagship of the Ward Line sailed from her berth at the foot of Wall Street in New York and into the pages of maritime history. Excited by the discovery of the TITANIC, there has been an ever-growing interest in disasters at sea, and the human toll associated with those tragedies. Little however is ever thought of the impacts those events had on the industry and how far reaching those impacts have been.

1934 in many ways was little different from today. People were struggling in a poor economy and political unrest existed throughout the world. In the maritime industry, the cruise lines of those days were struggling to keep their services in tact. Bookings were down, rates had been discounted and marginal companies were closing up shop. It was a time when the company with the fastest, newest and most elegant ship became the front-runner in the business. Crews were low paid and in many cases ill trained. Ships were built as inexpensively as possible and with government subsidy when available. Architects stuck to old proven methods of design and construction and older ships were kept running with ever decreasing investment.

It was in that environment of discount cruising, low paid crews and marginal operations that the Ward Line and her ships operated. It was an industry slow to change, regulated by inadequate agencies and protected by strong political ties. But still, cruising was popular, particularly for the young.

Imagine the excitement for a moment. Imagine how you worked months for those few extra dollars so you could buy a ticket for a seven day cruise to of all places, sunny Havana Cuba. Cigars, beautiful women, exciting Latin men, rum, and a voyage on a beautiful new ship. The language in the Ward Line brochures for their star ships, the MORRO CASTLE and ORIENTE was the same as one might read in modern times; "Exciting! Romantic! Tropical Paradise! One of the Most Beautiful Ships in the World! All at Prices You can Afford!"

Friends would drop you off on sailing day and wish you well. "Its only seven days and I'm planning on having fun!" you would shout as you walked up the gangway. And so the adventure began and oh, what a ship! You were already impressed by her gleaming black hull and bright white house as you saw her sitting at the dock. Once you entered the ship, it was if you had stepped into a four star hotel. Thick carpets and beautiful mahogany walls, elegant furniture everywhere and friendly crewmen welcoming you to your new adventure.

You didn't even notice what was going on around you as you made your way to your stateroom. Crewmen were quickly cleaning public spaces and handling trash and stores. Some ran quickly up the dock to make a phone call home while on break. Others were out on deck, doing maintenance and taking care of things that could only be done in port. For you, what was important was the amenities this ship had to offer. The food, the bar, the stateroom, the promise of a great vacation.

And for 250 crew, it was a job. You were lucky to get posted to this ship because the conditions were a bit better and the money a little higher. The men and women on the ship were no different than you or I, many supporting families, many working long hours, many happy to have a steady paycheck. They were experienced seamen and wait staff, used to dealing with temperamental passengers and drunks but happy to be working. A seven-day voyage to Havana was a routine, not glamorous and certainly not romantic.

And so the ships of the Ward Line, and many other companies, followed their routes to the sun, booked their passengers and tried to provide a service that met the expectations of their customers. The companies worked hard to keep the ships presentable, relying on the skill of the designers and builders to make sure they were attractive and safe. These ships were supposed to be floating hotels and equipped with the most modern of safety devices. Public spaces were equipped with fire detection equipment that could be monitored on the bridge. There were numerous fire stations with hoses throughout the ship and the crew held regular fire drills. The well-polished mahogany walls were only interrupted by fire screen doors, which could be activated from the bridge in case of emergency. Watchmen did regular patrols to catch anything that might be out of order, a lost wallet, forgotten purse or fire in a wastebasket started by a careless passenger with a cigarette.

Engineers like the ship as well. It was easy to work on particularly when something was broken. Ceiling panels were easily removed to get to drain pipes and electrical wires, which ran through special openings above fire screen doors. You could run a new wire from deck to deck if necessary through openings between decks and behind walls. If something was damaged, it could be easily replaced by the carpenters and made to look like new by the painters. The designers had really put some serious thought into this ship.

Since only the best crew got to work the best ships, the ship's captain knew he had the pick of the litter. They worked hard or they didn't work. No room for slackers on his ship. His officers were generally hand picked. He would only have those mates aboard whom he knew and trusted, and who did what they were told. He could not afford to have passengers complain or be unhappy. He also did not want them to be inconvenienced. Fire and boat drills were to be done quietly and passengers did not have to be involved, just crew. If was for their benefit anyway, and besides regulations did not require passengers attendance. He was very concerned about passenger safety in particular since one had slipped and fell from water from a leaking fire hydrant on a previous voyage. The passenger sued the line and the captain was reprimanded. Hydrants on all ships were to be capped and hoses stowed away. If there was a fire, the crew could get them out quickly.

Most crew were not expected to think for themselves, just do what they were told. If there was an emergency, an experienced officer would be there to direct them. Ships were run through the supreme authority of the ship's master, the closest thing to God on earth, and everyone was expected to follow his orders without question. Such was the atmosphere aboard the ships of the 1930's and such was the environment in which the MORRO CASTLE operated.

Voyage 174 of the SS MORRO CASTLE reads like a good mystery novel. There was labor unrest, gun running into Cuba, distrust among the officers, communists aboard. The captain died of mysterious causes, the ship caught fire at sea in the middle of a severe storm, the crew was accused of abandoning ship and leaving passengers to their fate. There was a supposed government cover-up to hide illegal activities with the Cuban government. Later, one of the ship's officers would turn out to be a murderer and be accused of arson.

In the aftermath, families would collect their dead relatives from the morgues on the New Jersey shore and ask the question "How could this have happened?" The government investigations started and one after another, ship's officers, crew and passengers were paraded before a Grand Jury of hand picked investigators looking into this terrible tragedy. They convicted the ship's acting captain, the chief engineer and a company official, all of whom were later cleared on appeal. The entire affair left a stigma of cover up, cowardice and mystery that 70 years later is still hotly debated.

Of this we are certain, 134 souls perished and the ship would drift ashore at Asbury Park New Jersey becoming that City's biggest tourist attraction. She would later be scrapped in Baltimore and eventually fade into history.

Yet, after every great tragedy, we always ask the same questions. What really changed in the wake of this disaster? What really did happen and what good ever came out of it?

It can be said that the burning of the MORRO CASTLE stunned the nation. Measured against the sinking of the TITANIC, the explosion of the Hindenburg or the recent World Trade Center attack, it may not be as easily recognized in history, but from that one incident on September 8th 1934, came the some of the most sweeping changes that were ever undertaken in the shipping industry, and still impact us today.

There are MORRO CASTLE groupies who will no doubt disagree with one I am about to say but to someone who has spent most of his life in this industry and stood on the bridge of many a ship, I am compelled to look at the reality of what happened. In the end, most significantly, no one is really to blame for what happened. This disaster was the result of circumstances that were the norm for the day.

The MORRO CASTLE was a wooden ship in a steel hull, and in most cases no different than most vessels of that era. She was built along the same lines as most other ships, using the same techniques and similar designs. Designed to be a floating hotel, the fire proof materials so common in modern ships were not even conceived of at the time. Her furnishings, carpets, finishes all were fuel for what was to happen. Behind walls and above ceilings, large openings allowed wires and pipes to pass easily between decks and interior spaces. A natural airflow insulated the interior from the decks heated by the warm tropical sun. She had been designed by one of the nation's top architects, Theodore Ferris, and built with the most advanced materials of the day. Even her safety equipment relied on the ability of the crew to monitor and then react to emergencies. All these things led to one single reality. When the MORRO CASTLE caught fire, nothing would have saved her. The ship was doomed from the moment the fire ignited.

I will always remember something my father told me about the moment he came out on deck after being called out just minutes after the fire had been discovered. He remembered the wind, the pelting rain and the silhouette of the glowing superstructure against the black night. A rolling wall of flames ran down the decks and engulfed everything in its path and the deck crew struggled to get to the upper decks to try to fight the fire. Nothing they should have done or could have done, would have changed the outcome.

While I have always held that the fire started spontaneously, there is real conjecture that it may have been deliberately set. No matter, the end result would have been the same. Any ship of that era would have faced the same fate. Our industry was just not mature enough to understand the threats that faced us at the time. It had only been less than a hundred years since the first steam passenger ship had crossed the Atlantic. This was still a very young industry and while the designers were very proud of the new and innovative ideas that had gone into ship safety, things really had not changed all that much.

The ships were inspected regularly by the Steamboat Inspection service. These were civilian inspectors, mostly from the industry, who knew there way around ships. But they did their jobs based on regulations that never anticipated what might happen on the MORRO CASTLE. Remember, the British Board of Trade certified that the TITANIC complied with regulations before she sailed from England and prior to 9-11, box cutters and small pocketknives were permitted aboard aircraft. Who could have ever anticipated what happened. The MORRO CASTLE was not the first ship to burn and there had been numerous investigations in previous incidents. Records and causes were extensive, but this was an industry that had enormous political power and was always claiming to be on the edge of financial ruin. There was no political will to change the regulations in an industry that was so critical to the nation's economy. Millions of passengers moved by water and incidents were few and far between. It was considered to be impractical to bring about significant changes that would cause this mode of transportation to face financial ruin and the government did not want to be in the position of bailing them out. Funny how some things never change.

And what of the men who manned this ship. They were called cowards, incompetent, disloyal, communists, negligent. Many say, "look at all the mistakes they made in dealing with the circumstances of the fire." They ran to the site of the blaze, raced to restore hoses to hydrants, broke windows to save passengers, and eventually were ordered off the ship into enormous seas in an effort to get to passengers at the stern. They were not formally trained, nor were they prepared to react to the circumstances that confronted them. The inferno on this ship was never anticipated and no one was prepared to deal with it. By sheer will and instinct, they tried to respond, some loosing their lives, some loosing their souls. Little had changed in the way ships were run and how men were trained. 19 years earlier on the deck of the TITANIC, there weren't even procedures for abandoning ship. 67 years later, who knew how to respond to aircraft hitting skyscrapers? In each of those cases, well trained or untrained, men called on their instincts and did the best they could. There is often a fine line between being a hero and being a coward.

And what of her captain? Prepared for sea aboard the school ship St. Mary's, he knew how to be a good seaman. Respected by his crew, he was thrust into command by the death of the ship's regular master. He inherited all of the circumstances that were not of his making. Admiral Halsey once commented that "there are no great men, only great challenges that ordinary men are forced by circumstance to meet." Imagine being in shoes of the captain of the MORRO CASTLE for one minute. In the middle of a storm, suddenly a report of fire, first thought-investigate, hopefully something easily contained so the passengers would not be shaken. Spreading quickly, call out the crew and get it under control. Alarms are going off. Heavy smoke being report on B deck, flames being seen on the boat deck, get the fire pumps going, get the passengers out and up to the boats, smoke is choking everyone below-get her into the wind so the smoke blows clear, what about an SOS, sound the general alarm, we are loosing steering, hard left, I can't hold her, stop the engines, I can't get the engine room, what about as SOS, the boats are burning, we're loosing fire main pressure, what about an SOS, send the damn SOS, she's in a hard turn, we can only get some of the boats clear, the passengers are all running aft, get the boats in the water and have them row aft to pick up the passengers, she is still underway, stop the damn ship, I can't get the engine room, who is screaming, get the boats away they're burning, shut those alarms off, we have lost all water pressure, call the chief, he's on the bridge and can't get to the engine room, the whole house is on fire, we got to get off the bridge, its starting to burn…….my God, what is happening.

Only a few minutes had passed and he never had a chance. Imagine for a moment how he felt, or how the captain of the TITANIC felt when he knew his ship was doomed, or the pilot of the Hindenberg when the flames exploded around him or the fire chief when he knew the World Trade Center was collapsing. There is a moment when you realize that for all of your skill, you strength, or your will-that you are not in control. And afterwards, you will live through the torment of hearing what you should have done, could have done, might have done. Capt. Warms said it best, "How could you know if you were not there".

70 years have nearly passed; we debate, discuss, and argue about the entire event still. But of that incident, much good came. Ships are fireproof and designed to inhibit the spread of fire no matter what actions the crew may or may not take. Computerized fire fighting systems can detect and fight fires without putting people in harm's way. Regulations specify how vessels are to be built and of what material and every step in the process is inspected. Research on the cause and spread of fires is widespread and shared. Regulatory compliance in this country is under the watchful eye of the Coast Guard. Regulations are nearly universal and dictate the minimum standards all seamen must meet. Crews are trained in firefighting and crowd control. Seamen are trained to be managers instead of captains next to God. Curriculums at maritime schools include elements of studying the human factor in responding to emergencies. We study the errors those before us have made; we learn how to work together as teams. We put ourselves in the position of anticipating what might happen.

The end result is that because of the MORRO CASTLE, hundreds of thousands of people cruise annually on some of the safest ships ever conceived. We ask ourselves constantly if we can make it better and the industry has been put to the test. Fires aboard modern cruise ships have been easily contained and extinguished with no loss of life. If you look at the modern cruise ship with 3,000 passengers and 1,500 crew, the MORRO CASTLE with 500 passengers and crew, was pale in comparison. Yet this little ship has set the stage for how modern ships are built, manned and operated. That is the legacy of this disaster, this ship, her crew and her passengers.

The MORRO CASTLE is also a testimony to the human spirit and to our ability to rise above adversity and death and capture something worthy of the sacrifice we are often called upon to give. No matter what your belief about what happened in the early morning hours of September 8th, 1934, the fact that we have been able to make the seas safer for those who travel in great ships for pleasure or business is without dispute. As we look to the future, we remember those moments in history that have defined us as a nation, as a society and as an industry. The OCEAN MONARCH, the SULTANA, the PORTLAND, the GENERAL SLOCUM, the VOLTURNO, the TITANIC, the EMPRESS OF IRELAND, the LUSITANIA, the VESTRIS, the DORCHESTER, the MORRO CASTLE, the ANDREA DORIA, all have left legacies that have made the seas safer for mankind. In each of those events, the human spirit has always shown through. It is a testament to our ability to rise above trial and tragedy and triumph. In that, we must look to how we have met those challenges and become better for it. In that, we must also remember the lessons of those events as we face our own challenges today. The disasters that befell ships in those days were measured in the same way we looked at the attack on the World Trade Center just a few years past. The loss of life, the pain, the suffering, the courage, and the tears, all are common threads of both tragedy and of our human spirit. In the end, we rise again, begin anew and find a way to better ourselves.

In the wake of the MORRO CASTLE rest the lives of those who died that night and those who lived. It is a testament to all of them that we are better off for what they went through and a tribute to them, that we are safer today for their sacrifice. In that knowledge, may they all find peace. Thank you.